Abstract-A schedule coordination problem involving two train services provided by different operators is modeled as an optimization of revenue intake. The coordination is achieved through the adjustment of commencement times of the train services by negotiation. The problem is subject to constraints regarding to passenger demands and idle costs of rolling-stocks from both operators. This paper models the operators as software agents having the flexibility to incorporate one of the two (and potentially more) proposed negotiation strategies. Empirical results show that agents employing different combination of strategies have significant impact on the quality of solution and negotiation time.
I. INTRODUCTION
A N open railway access market basically consists of an infrastructure provider (IP) and a number oftrain service providers (TSPs). The TSPs may compete either directly by serving identical railway lines or, more commonly, moderately by serving overlapping lines. Through competitions, the railways are not only expected to utilize their resources more efficiently, but quality of service may also be improved to attract more transportation demands towards the railways.
An example of moderate competition is shown in Fig. 1 . TSP-1 is operating a line to and from stations A and F, stopping at intermediate stations B, C, D and E. On the other hand, TSP-2 is operating a line to and from stations G and J, dwelling at stations H, C, D, E and I. Despite the competition ofpassenger demand between stations C to E, it is possible to improve the revenue intake for both parties if passengers can travel across the two lines by coordinating the train schedules at a common transfer node (e.g. station C).
The schedule coordination problem in integrated railways, where train services are solely provided by a single authority, often concerns on the minimization ofpassenger waiting time by adjusting the commencement times of a set of train services. Such problem has been extensively studied in the literature. When coordinating train services at a single station, the arrival times of a service have been modeled by a set of vertices ofa polygon within a unit circle [1] , [2] . The problem is then to minimize the total arc lengths between the vertices on the circumference of the circle. When coordinating a set of Manuscript J .
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J. trains at multiple transfer stations, the problem has been shown to be NP-hard [3] and it has been solved using a branch-and-bound algorithm for optimal solution [3] , and using a genetic algorithm for near-optimal solutions [4] . Despite the efforts in the schedule coordination problem in the integrated railways, the effect of open market has altered the nature of the problem. Firstly, the lines are now managed by different TSPs instead of a single authority. As a result, the alignment of schedules requires a mutual agreement from more than one party, whose operating constraints and objectives may be in conflict with the other operators. In particular, there may be constraints regarding to the earliest commencement time due to the availability of rolling-stock, and it is also desirable to consider the cost of idle time for the rolling-stock. Moreover, sensitive data such as cost rates are unlikely to be revealed to the other TSPs. This means decisions on the coordinated schedules are often made under incomplete information through negotiation activities. These changes prompt the remodeling of the schedule coordination problem.
Agent modeling [5] is particularly suitable for constructing distributed systems where entities are self-interested, and they interact through communicative acts such as negotiation [6] . The (4', 4k) , the net revenue collected from the transfer of passengers is modeled by (1) .
where Y is the net increase in revenue of L,; k. is the average cost charged to a transferring passenger; G (4,, 4j Passenger demand is assumed to be affected by the waiting time at X. The longer is the waiting time, the lower is the demand. In this study, the demand from Li to L1 in relation to the waiting time is modeled by a quadratic function in (3) subject to (4 (4) where zi =h1 +d -h -ik,, and w,, is the lowest waiting time resulting in zero demand. When the waiting time is zero, the function achieves maximum demand at Gij. As the waiting time increases, progressively more passengers will opt for alternative means of travel such as automobiles.
2) Definition of F(() Let , ' " be the earliest time that the rolling-stock is available at the first station. This is often known as the release date in scheduling. If Li commences at 47n, then the idle cost is zero. As this time is postponed, the idle cost increases proportionally. Let ci be the unit cost of idle time. F(4) is then modeled by (5) subject to (6) . F(4,) = c, 4i . 4ln
B. Negotiation Procedures Negotiation is conducted by exchanging offers in a series of negotiation rounds. The TSP agent submitting the first offer is called the initiator. The negotiating partner (proponent) is called the responder.
An offer at round k consists of the proposed commencement times of the initiator and the responder. Without the loss of generality, the initiator and responder are assigned to be TSP-i and TSP-j respectively. An offer is therefore modeled by (7) . Ok = ( 4, ,k ) (
The cost associated with the offer ok is assumed to be stored internally by the agent, represented by Yk . Suppose TSP-i is the initiator, then the offers in the odd rounds of negotiation (i.e. k = 2m -1, for m = 1, 2, ... ) are proposed by TSP-i, while offers in the even rounds of negotiation (i.e. k = 2m ) are generated by TSP-j .
The general negotiation procedure is shown in Fig. 2 . The action set of an agent are {propose, accept, failure}. At the beginning, the initiator generates the offer which maximizes (1) subject to (4) and (6) . If the offer exists, it is proposed to the proponent. Otherwise, no action is taken. Upon the arrival of the counteroffer from the proponent, the agent evaluates the associated cost of the counteroffer and updates ok ' which is the first occurrence of counteroffer with the highest cost y k received at round k. In addition, the agent also computes the next potential offer O using one of the strategies, Strategy-PO (Spo) or Strategy-MAX (Smax), which are described in the following subsection. Ifno potential offer can be found, the negotiation is terminated with the failure action. If the offer does exist, the agent proposes O* when Y* > yk and accepts 0k otherwise.
C. Negotiation Strategies 1) Strategy-PO (Spo). This strategy aims to derive the Pareto-optimal solution and it requires both agents to employ this strategy to achieve the objective. According to the definition of Pareto-optimality [ Fig. 3 .
Partition A: This partition consists of the proposals prior to round k . In the odd rounds within this set (i.e. 2m -1 < k), although the costs of the initiator are higher (i.e. y2,n-1 2 the costs of the responder are lower (i.e. Y'2m-1 Y, )k
Otherwise the condition of acceptance would have been detected by the responder (Fig. 3) . Since As a result, no offers can improve the costs of both parties simultaneously when the condition of acceptance is detected by the initiator. The proof for the responder can be constructed in a similar manner. This completes the proof 2) Strategy-M4X (Sinax). To reach the Pareto-optimal solution, both parties must employ Spo. Despite the theoretical significance of such solution, stakeholders often aim to achieve a better cost in practice, even ifthe proponent suffers from a loss. As a consequence, it is also worth examining other negotiation strategies (or combination of strategies), and compare their resultant offers from the Pareto-optimal solution obtained by Spo.
In Smax, it is assumed that only one variable can be changed in o k+I with respect to the counteroffer o k The agent determines which variable, either 4I-or Sk-, should be changed in order to maximize the difference of Y* -P. In the definitions of the negotiation strategies, it has been assumed that an algorithm exists in generating the necessary offers. In this section, a simple algorithm from the perspective of TSP-i is proposed for each strategy. where << represents significantly smaller than.
III. ALGORITHM FOR OFFER GENERATION
Step 1: Compute the costs for all combination of solutions (g,4j) for < < +nn and ;'-n < .< '+n where
Step 2: Sort the solutions in descending order oftheir costs using a sorting algorithm such as the Quicksort.
The above algorithm intuitively generates all the possible offers expected to encounter during the negotiation. Since the release date of the proponent is unknown, it is estimated by the earliest arrival time of its service and the journey time of the proponent's service. As the release date may be either earlier or later than this estimation, the upper and lower bounds are calculated by adding and subtracting by n, respectively. ni can be taken as 60mins if the earliest arrival times are at close proximity (e.g. within lOmins).
2) Strategy-MAX (Smax). Let the most recent counteroffer received be (4k, 4,). With the same definitions of ni and ', the algorithm for Smax is given as follows.
Step 1: Compute the costs of all solutions ((, ), for '-ni < .j < 4'+n, . Step 2: Compute the costs of all solutions (4, 4), for ;r< n < n + n.
Step 3: Select the best offer from steps 1 and 2. If the offer has been proposed previously, select the next best offer.
IV. SIMULATION SETUP AND RESULTS
A. Simulation Setup The negotiation model is implemented with the aid of JADE (Java Agent DEvelopment Framework) [12] . JADE is a FIPA-compliant software framework which provides generic functions for agent development. Table I shows the settings of two TSP agents which are employed in the simulation studies. Using the data, the two agents are set up to conduct four negotiations with different combinations of strategies. If (SI, S2) denotes the strategies employed by TSP-1 and TSP-2 respectively, the four combinations are (Spo, Spo), (Spo, Smax), (Smax, Spo), and (Smax, Smax). TSP-I first initiates the negotiation by proposing (8, The cost of (16, 5) for TSP-1 is 87.0% (Table IV) Since the cost of the latter offer is higher, TSP-1 selects (13, 5) as the potential offer. As the cost is also higher than that of the counteroffer, TSP-proposes (13, 5) to TSP-2.
In Table III , the cost of (13, 5) for TSP-2 is 97%. Upon the reception of the counteroffer, TSP-2 finds that the cost of the second best offer is (17, 5) and its cost is higher than the cost ofthe best counteroffer received so far. Thus, it is proposed to the TSP-1.
The process iterates, where TSP-1 and TSP-2 propose alternately with offers (12, 5) with the definition of the strategy. On the other hand, when TSP-2 employs Smax, its costs do not change monotonically because Smax generates offers by modifying the counteroffer received in the previous round. Hence, the solution can either be higher or lower than its previous offer. The fluctuations may sometime be very large because it highly depends on the quality of the counteroffers received.
The solution of (Smax, Spo) is not Pareto-optimal since the cost ofTSP-I is lower, even though TSP-2 has benefited from an increase in cost. Similarly, the solution of (Siax, Smax) is not Pareto-optimal because the costs on both agents are lower. The concessions are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 respectively. From the passenger perspective, the Pareto-optimal solution requires waiting times of 7mins, and Imin for the transfers from L, to L2, and L, to L2 respectively. As for the suboptimal solutions, (Si,ax, Spo) reduces the waiting time of the transfer from Li to L2 by two minutes but increases the waiting time by the same amount in the reverse direction. On the other hand, the waiting times obtained by (Smax, Smax) are identical to the Pareto-optimal solution. In other words, despite the differences resulted to the two TSPs, the change is unnoticeable to the passengers.
3) Negotiation Time: The number of rounds required for negotiation is also shown in Table II By attempting to reduce the concession with reference to the counteroffer, the agent employing Smax is likely to concede in larger steps in successive negotiation rounds.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a model for the schedule coordination problem involving two train services in an open access market. The problem has been modeled as two separate agents conducting individual optimizations, but interacting through negotiation. Through the agent negotiation process, the TSPs are enabled to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.
With the proposed negotiation framework, the agents are also allowed to employ their own negotiation strategies. Two negotiation strategies have been proposed. Spo is derived so that when both agents are employing this strategy, the resulting agreement is guaranteed to reach the Pareto-optimal solution. However, as suggested by the simulation result, Spo often requires a large number of simulation rounds before the agreement can be reached. To reduce the possibility of excessive negotiation time, TSP may opt for Smax, which tends to concede at larger steps by modifying the counteroffers from the proponent. Nevertheless, the TSP is at a risk of deviating from the Pareto-optimal solution.
The study also generates further research opportunities. For example, the algorithms used for the negotiation strategies may be replaced by more intelligent searching algorithms. Since the cost function in (1) is inherently quadratic in nature, the authors are examining the possible use of quadratic programming with the incorporation of a tree searching algorithm. In addition, it is also worth investigating the performance of other negotiation strategies other than the proposed ones in the paper.
